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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, j 
vs. ) case Xo. 910349 
FEDERICO PEREZ, ) 
Defendant/Appellant ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
I JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Section (Title) 78-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
II ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was defendant in custody or had he been restrained in 
any way or unreasonably detained by the officer at the time the 
consent to search was given? 
2. Did the State sustain the burden of proving that the 
consent to search was voluntary and valid? 
3. Did the search of the vehicle exceed the scope of the 
consent given? 
4. Were defendants rights against unreasonable search and 
seizure as guaranteed by the fourth amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution violated by the officer's detention and search of 
defendant's vehicle? 
The standard for review is that a trial court's finding 
should be set aside if it is clearly erroneous or if i; is not 
supported by substantial competent evidence. - Rules of Civ. 
Proc . , Rule 5 2 (a ) . 
III. STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant/appellant is a Mexican national 22 years of age at 
the time of arrest with a limited ability to speak and understand 
the English language. His scholastic education was just four years 
and he had lived in the United States four years. 
About 4:00 p.m. on February 27, 1991 defendant had stopped the 
pick-up he was driving near mile post 15 on Interstate 15 in 
Washington County to check the brakes. The vehicle had Nebraska 
plates, was registered in the State of Nebraska and belonged to 
defendant's brother who lived in Nebraska. 
Utah Highway Patrolman Kevin Davis observed the stopped ve-
hicle and approached to see if any help was needed. Officer Davis 
noticed that the side windows were tinted in excess of what Utah 
law allows and asked defendant for his driver's license and ve-
cie registration. When the door was opened to give the license 
and registration to the officer he detected an odor of air fresh-
eners and saw several of them inside the pick-up. The officer 
noticed that the last name on the registration was different from 
defendant's and was told that the pick-up belonged to a brother. 
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Officer Davis took the license and registration to his ve-
hicle, had his dispatcher run a check to see if the pick-up was 
stolen and prepared a warning notice for the tinted windows. 
While giving the warning notice, registration and license to 
defendant Officer Davis noticed several fast food containers 
(empty soft drink containers and a sack from a restaurant) and 
a welded section in the bed of the pick-up. Officer Davis asked 
defendant if he was carrying any guns, knives, alcohol, illegal 
contraband or anything like that in his vehicle and,receiving a 
response of "no" asKed defendant if he could search the vehicle. 
Officer Davis checked the welded section in the bed of the 
pick-up and satisfied himself that it was indeed a repair that 
could not have been made from the outside of the pick-up. He 
then requested to search the cab and asked the defendant and his 
passenger to stand off the side of the road at the rear of the 
pick-up. While searcnmg the cab another officer, Jim Lloyd, 
arrived and, without speaking to defendant or getting his per-
mission to search, assisted officer Davis in the search. By 
removing a little plastic cylindrical-shaped object from the 
stereo speaker the officers could see something hidden inside 
the speaker and with trooper Davis' screwdriver they opened up 
the speaker and found a small plastic bag containing approximate-
ly 700 grams of purportedly cocaine. 
Defendant and passenger Pedro Mandoza-Mares were arrested 
and transported to the Washington County Jail where they were 
booked and subsequently charged with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute. A suppression of evidence 
hearing was held May 17, and 23, 1991 before the Honorable Hon. 
J. Philip Eves, District Judge, and defendant's motion to sup-
press evidence was denied. Charges were dismissed against the 
passenger and defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty and 
on July 10, 1991 was sentenced to a term of five years to life 
in the Utah State Prison. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Fact 1. While appellant was stopped to check vehicle's 
brakes officer Davis approached to offer help and noticed tinted 
side windows in excess of what Utah's law allows. 
Fact 2. While obtaining driver's license and vehicle reg-
istration from defendant, officer Davis detected an odor of air 
fresheners and observed several air fresheners in the cab. 
Fact 3. After checking with dispatcher to determine if 
pick-up was reported stolen, officer Davis returned the license 
and registration and gave him a warning notice for tinted win-
dows. While doing so he noticed empty fast food containers and 
a re-welded section in the bed of the pick-up. 
Fact 4. Until officer Davis asked defendant for his driver's 
license and vehicle registration he had seen no evidence of any 
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criminal activity except trie tinted winanw-. , 
Fac• \neti officer Cavis returnee the driver's license 
and registration TO defendant and gave h 1 rn the warning notice 
for the tinted window? the enforcement vv inp n.n 'onitietj. 
Fact n , iMiipi \ Last t ood containers and numerous ii: fresh-
eners m a vehicle are net indicia of criminal activity. 
Fact ~ . >fter completion f h1" "lit rcemen' .icticri officer 
Davis continued t detain aerenaant to ask him what he was carry-
ing and to request permission to search tne venicle. 
Fact S . Officer Itsvi , -"ic^n 1} M'ficet Lloyd w ^ z 11 
not ia\c attendant 's permission to search, made a aetailet search 
of tne venicle and Dy aismaritling J speaker discovered . r I j—io 
baa containing ahmr 7n"'' train- f L U I P : * e a . ; cocaine. 
Fact 9. Appellant ana his passenger were arrestee, taken 
to the Washington County Jail, booked and charged v itn to?session 
of a controlled -.upotjiic „n ' nitcnt to distribute. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The detention of appellant after receiving the1 wnvunc' notice 
for tintea windows n \ order for officer Davis to ask what ne was 
carrying m the picK-up and to request permission to searcn and 
tne suDseouent searcn was an unlawful seizure and seam; „mcn 
vioiatea aef^nnnn4 i ,mts guaranteed hv the tourth amendment 
of the Unitet States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Officer Davis had no articulable suspicion nor reasonable 
basis to ask what defendant was carrying in his pick-up or to 
request permission to search same. The consent to search obtained 
by officer Davis was not voluntarily given nor free from duress 
and/or coercion. It was obtained through the exploitation of the 
illegal and unjustified detainment by officer Davis of defendant. 
Findings No.'s 3 and 6 of the trial court are not supported 
by the evidence. Finding No. 3 states: 
" That the defendant was not in custody nor had 
he been restrained in any way or unreasonably 
detained by the officer at the time the consent 
was given." 
Finding No. 6 states: 
"That the defendant understood the officer when 
he requested permission to search the vehicle, 
and consent was knowingly and voluntarily given." 
Even if the State could show some evidentiary support for 
Finding No. 6, it did not address nor try to show that the con-
sent was not obtained through the exploitation of the officer's 
unlawful detainment of defendant. Only a valid consent given 
by the defendant would waive his protected rights under the 
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
Appellant was seized and searched without a warrant in vio-
lation of his rights guaranteed by the fourth amenc.nent of the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. After checking defendant's license, running a 
computer check for stolen vehicles and issuing a warning notice 
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for tinted windows, officer Davis further detained defendant by 
asking I iim if he had any guns, alcohol, illegal contraband or 
a i 1 y 11 1 i i i g J i 1 : e t h a t a i i. d i i p o i :;i i: e c e i v i n g a negative a n s v e r r e q u e s t e d 
p e r m i s s i o n to searcn the. v e h i c l e . (Hnq. [r. . 11) 
Of f i c e r Davis stated that d e f e n d a n t was v" " v fre e t o g c a f t e r 
ih' WM.„ qive! i. !II.J hiirnii. < r.utn.v tor tinted o in H O W S . (Hng. I r. 37, 38) 
Officer Davis testifies that they (defendant ana passenger1 were 
not free to go because ne was going it ,I--> r r.e?° :f he." cuuM sedrch 
tr/. VI^UL'IL. Iher^ was, however, some or*_l lmmar y Dialogue by 
Officer Davis. lie triea IL explain to aeienaar.: tnat pari cf the 
vvarninq notice marked as a opeectinq a m i izursouo equipme^1 , iul \-
tjon M i not apply 'Hng. Tr . I . 16 j, that ne defendant) did not 
nave to appear ami that there was no fine involves, 'Hnq. I r . r. 26) 
Then, after i I v I i ri d e f e n a a r i t he wa r i I :i i I y : i o t i c e a n d 11 > i ng t o 
e x p l a i n it, otricei Davis asked d e f e n d a n t if he was c a r r y i n g any 
guns, knive^> et^. anc receiving a negative answer requested per-
mission to searci T n- Trenicie: I rie oniorcement action for the 
tinted window; haa a^reac\ oeen completed. Defendant should have 
been free to GO. .nstead officer Davis launched into a: . --- -
gator\ conversat K1' u 1 rM ei tn i ir it detendant was engagea . :. ^ or-
criminal aetivit\, This was clearly police misconduct and it 
placed the Jourden or. tne State to prove that the consent cviven 
was vclnnrnr- ano v T x an" no;, an exploitation of the police 
mi sconduct. 
Officer lavis stated that he had not ofc---"-
or anything there at the vehicle which would indicate a crime 
was in progress. (Hng. Tr. P.19) He further testified that he 
had no indication or suspicion of any criminal offense at the 
time he gave the warning notice for the tinted windows to 
defendant. (Hng. Tr. ?.21) On further guestioning officer Davis 
testified that the numerous air fresheners, empty fast food con-
tainers, the vehicle not registered to the driver and a re-welded 
section in the bed of the pick-up made him suspicious. (Hng. 
Tr. P. 26, P. 27) 
Defendant was a 22 year old Mexican national, had lived in 
the United States for four years and only understood a little of 
what Officer Davis was saying to him. This was shown by the 
prosecutor's guestions and defendant's answers on page 65 of 
the hearing transcript: 
Q. How long did you live in St. George? 
A. Three years. 
Q. Do you speaK English? 
A. A little. 
Q. When -- when Trooper Davis asked you to -- if he 
could search the truck, you understood what he 
was saying, didn't you? 
A. Just a little. 
Q. Why did you tell him yes? 
A. Because I understand only a little. That's why. 
Officer Davis was an experienced police officer, having 
been with the Utah Highway Patrol for 13 years and 9 months. 
The patrolman's offer to no I i , f he n u n i • < »l u 1 ,, * r JM n .j 
nuii':»j lit.itecij i-l i ticket requiring an appearance, the explan-
ation that two of trie checKec items on t no warnirn not::-' aia 
not apply to def enaant , thV «i f-» f ^ n n --" * tonl i in I 1J j . • appear 
or pay a fine and finally the query of what defendant was carry-
ing 11 I the pick-up constituted a subtle but coercive approach 
or foundation for ti ie patro 1 mai i 's questior i - Cai i I search the 
truck,1 Defendant uas in .-. dilemma. He could hardly answer 'no' 
after ne nac lust tola the officer that he was carrying no guns, 
knives, aioonnl "'nr.rapan: n : unv .:ma or anytning liKe that. 
Black's Law Dictionary - Thirc Idition defines coercion as 
"compulsion or force mav re either actual (direct 
or positive) or implied (legal or constructive) wnere 
the relation of the parties is such that one is under 
subjection to the other, and is thereby constrained to 
do what his free will would refuse.' 
in State vs. Robinson '797 P2d. 431) a Utah 1^"' t^ise in-
volving u routine f :u:":ic violation stop for abruptly polling 
in front of a highway patrolman traveling in the same direction 




 * An officer conducting a routine traffic stop 
may request a driver's license and vehicle registra-
tion, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. 
(United States v. Guzman), 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 
(10th Cir.1988). However, once the driver has pro-
duced a valid license and evidence of entitlement to 
use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on 
his way, without being subject to further delay by 
police for additional questioning" _I_d . Any further 
temporary detention for investigative questioning 
after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial 
traffic stop is rust ified under the fourth amendment 
only if the detaining officer has a reasonable sus-
picion of serious criminal activity. * * * The de-
taining officers must be able to articulate a partic-
ularized and objective basis for their suspicions 
that is drawn from the totality of circumstances 
facing them at the time of the seizure. United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 
690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see State 
v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah) 1987) 
In the Robinson case the van used by the defendants was owned 
by and registered to Robinson's employer. While questioning the 
defendants the two patrol officers noticed a nervousness on one 
of the defendants, a built up bed in the carpeted back of the 
van, a lack of cold weather clothing after defendants had in-
formed the officers that they were going on a fishing trip in 
Wyoming with some friends. The officers decided to ask permission 
to search the van and after giving the warning citation for the 
improper lane change asked the defendants if they were carrying 
any weapons, large sums of money, or narcotics. They both said 
"no" and trooper Garcia asked them if they could make a search 
of the van. According to the troopers defendant Robinson verbally 
agreed to the search took the keys from the ignition and opened 
the van's rear doors. The officers wanted to search in a closed 
compartment under the built-up bed and finally, after a threat to 
impound the van and obtain a search warrant permission was given 
for a dog to go through the van. Defendants were arrested after 
the dog gave a positive alert and the officers found eight duffel 
bags of marijuana in the space under the bed's platform. The 
court stated that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion 
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of car theft or other -rjnuii < i i me ouiip'ient :o lustify the 
routloide detention an:: questioning that followed and stated: 
" In sun,, we conclude chat the trial court clearly 
erred in its finding that the troopers had the reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their 
continued detention and questioning of Pobmson and Tower; 
once the warning citation was given and the purposes for 
the initial stop had been accomplished. Defendants" 
detention after tnat point was, therefore, a violatirif 
of their fourth amendment rights." 
Ine ..tat- 'jcr.tenri' ^  tnat t;ie m^1 • • * • :: 
- ~- r .. . J:. : t i tut i ona 1 :e:ei:::.:, cecause Rocuisc: 
;:onsento .• to t:t•_* warrantless sear: 
.Vu lector' dotern.rn t no trio. .Lo-it -^ ^ sear en 
i^ lawtuiiy ootameu toi^owirig edict1 action that violates 
tne fourth amendment, such as the unlawful detention tert 
\l] tnt_ consent must be voluntary in fact; ^nc _ tn-
consent must not ro attained bv police exploitation . f 
the prior illegality. Arroyo, T9r- i ..a 684. hotr. ie:t, 
must ot met in order for evidenc- obtained in searches 
fcllovir.: to 1 ice -lieaaiitv to ce admissible. Id. 
* I n exam:._:.'_: ^ _ t:.-_ cut t _. un^ . . n^ .. ,: cams tances 
tt aetermm* . :' _n fact trie consent to search was coercec 
. court must tart int. mcount ootn tn- details of pci.Ct 
conduct and tne characteristics of tne accused, Arroyo, 
796 ?.2d at 6~— void: tnciuae "susti' coercive police 
questions, as well as tne possible vulnerao^^ subjec-
tive state of the ocrsc w:i- consent . ' 
'' *
 +
 * I n 1 i ah t : : t nr tree oer s • au^s t i on i n t anc tci -
auct, trie coercive atmospnere at tne time., «-;-- concmc-
that tne State nas not borne its buraen of proving that 
pobms:- 't tenser*- to searct tn-* ver.y.t-' waf v Luntary". 
.n commonwealth vs. : tiroes 22" * •- .' ~ 
opened a shaving kit fell out and the officer asked "what is that?" 
Appellant stated it was his shaving kit and unzipped the top, ex-
posing its contents and one of the officers observed a number of 
vials; one of which contained marijuana. Appellant was arrested, 
given his Miranda warning, a search warrant was obtained to 
search the car and ten kilos of marijuana were uncovered. The 
court dealt with the consent of appellant by opening the car 
door and unzipping the shaving kit when the officer asked what 
it was. Among other things the court stated: 
" * * * Since consent to an otherwise illegal search in-
volves a waiver of the right to be free from such sear-
ches, the consent in question must meet the test of con-
stitutional waiver. * * * That is, the waiver must meet 
two requirements: it must be 1) voluntary, and 2) intel-
ligent, (cases cited) 
11
 Since a fundamental right guaranteed by the Consti-
tution is involved, a waiver will not lightly be found." 
" * * * Consent must be freely given to be effective. 
This means there must be a total absence of coercion, 
express or implied. * * * Mere acquiescence to the orders 
suggestions, or requests of the police can never be e-
quated with consent. (cases cited) * * * Thus, a find-
ing of voluntary consent can never rest solely on the 
fact that an accused did some consensual act or gave per-
mission to the police to search, but is a question of 
fact which must be decided in light of the circumstances 
attending the alleged consent.(Citation) 
" Among the factors to be considered are the setting in 
which the consent was obtained; what was said and done 
by the parties present; the age, intelligence and educa-
tional background of the person consenting." 
"* * * Added to these elements indicating involuntariness, 
is the fact that appellant did not understand English very 
well. * * * While this factor would seem more appropriately 
discussed in an analysis of the intelligence of the con-
sent, it is an appropriate inquiry here because "under 
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many circumstances a reasonable person might read an 
officer's (polite request) as a courteous expression 
of a demand backed by force of law. (case cited) 
Thus, a person without a facility in the English lan-
guage might understand a request, however phrased, 
to be an order and thus merely acquiesce, rather than 
voluntarily consent to the request. 
In State v. Arroyo, "96 P.2d 684 (1990) the Utah Supreme 
Court reviewed a decision of the Court of Appeals on the same 
case reported in 770 P.2d 153 (1989; because the case presented 
important issues concerning the effect of consent searches amd 
pretextual traffic stops under the fourth amendment After a 
fairly exhaustive review cf leading cases from Utah and other 
states the court stated: 
•• * * * Two factors determine whether consent to a 
search is lawfully obtained following initial police 
misconduct. The inquiry should focus on whether the 
consent was voluntary and whether the consent was ob-
tained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. 
Evidence obtained in searches following police illegal-
ity must meet both tests to be admissible. 
The case law holds that a consent which is not vol-
untarily given is invalid, (cases cited) * * * 
Generally, whether the requisite voluntariness exists 
depends on "the totality of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances—both the characteristics of the accused 
and the details of police conduct, (cases cited) 
A second factor is whether consent was obtained 
tnrough police exploitation of the primary or ante-
cedent police illegality. 
The court cited Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, as an ex-
ample cf the application of the second part of the two part test 
In Royer, a suspect who matched a drug courier profile was de-
tained at an airport by two police officers who requested and re 
tained the suspect's airline ticket and driver's license. The 
officers asked Royer to accompany them to a room in the airport. 
The officers retrieved Rover's luggage from the airline and ob-
tained Rover's consent to open and search the luggage. The 
search uncovered narcotics. The trial court subsequently found 
that Royer's consent was "freely and voluntarily given" and there-
fore denied a suppression motion. The Supreme Court held that the 
detention of Royer constituted an illegal seizure. 460 U.S. 507. 
Without questioning the assertion that Royer's consent was "freely 
and voluntarily given" the plurality opinion concluded that "the 
consent was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to jus-
tify the search." 460 U.S. at 507-08. Thus, the exploitation of 
illegality of the detention was the determinative factor, despite 
the voluntariness of the consent. 
The court also cited People v. Odom, 404 N.E. 2d 997 (1980) 
which stated" 
"* * * However, a finding that the defendant's consent 
to search was voluntarily given is but one step in the 
determination of the propriety of the search, because 
even if the consent were voluntary it still may have 
been obtained by the exploitation of an illegal arrest 
.... Therefore the question before us is whether Odom's 
consent was obtained by the exploitation of an illegal 
arrest, or "by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint." 
Finally the court dealt with the scope of consent and stated: 
" Finally, a search supported by voluntary consent 
which is not an exploitation of the primary illegality 
may still be found invalid if the search exceeds the 
scope of the consent. 
" * * * Assuming . . . that a general and unqualified 
consent was given, then the boundaries of the place 
referred to mark the outer physical limits of the 
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authorized search. Even within these limits, however, 
the police do not have carte blanche to do whatever 
they please. Certainly they may not engage in search 
activity which involves the destruction of property, 
and this would seem to bar breaking into locked con-
tainers. (Citations) * * * A general consent to 
search . . . would not . . . sanction . . .the tearing 
down of walls . . . " 
In a recent case of State v. Carter, 162 Utah Adv. Rep.32 
The Court of Appeals has applied the two-part test to determine 
the validity of consent for a search following a police unlawful 
detainment. In this case two narcotic officers in plain clothes 
noticed defendant as he carried a duffel bag deplaning from a 
flight at the Salt Lake City Airport. After observing him for a 
short time one of the officers approached him, identified him-
self as a police officer and asked to see his plane ticket and to 
show some identification. As defendant was bent over looking for 
some identification in his duffel bag the officer noticed a line 
proceeding from defendant's shirt and after identifying himself 
as a narcotics officer asked permission to search defendant's bag 
and the other officer asked permission to search his person. De-
fendant responded "go ahead". During the pat-down search a bulge 
and tape were detected and after a request to see the bulge and 
tape and moving inside to a room in the airport the defendant 
stated "you've got me, you might as well have this11, revealing 
the package on his lower abdomen which contained cocaine. 
The trial court held that at the time the encounter advanced 
to the point where the defendant did not feel free to leave the 
-15-
the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe he was transport-
ing drugs and that all searches were pursuant to defendant's vol-
untary consent. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals dealt with whether there was 
reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and whether his consents 
to the curbside searches of his person were both voluntary and 
sufficiently attenuated from any prior illegality to justify the 
searches. The court reviewed the case law involving the right of 
an officer to approach and seize a person as set forth by the 
Supreme Court in State v. Deitmer, 739 P2d 616 (1987). 
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that there 
was no reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was transporting 
narcotics at the time the officers conducted a pat-down search of 
his person. Specifically the trial judge had stated: 
"1. The Court specifically discredits the officers ability 
to form a reasonable articulate suspicion prior to the 
time of the defendant's failure to provide an identifica-
tion upon request. 
2. The Court concludes that the absence or the failure 
of the defendant to produce identification also was not 
by itself, or in the aggregate with the previously listed 
factors, sufficient to indicate a reasonable articulable 
suspicion. 
3. The Court further concludes that the officer's perception 
of a line just at or above the defendant's waist, but un-
der his outer clothing, was not a reasonable articulable 
suspicion by itself or in combination with anything pre-
viously noted. 
4. The Court further concludes that the pat down search 
and observations made by the officers, including the 
feeling of the bulge, at that time was not sufficient 
to constitute a reasonable suspicion either alone or 
in the aggregate-" 
-16-
Notwithstanding the illegal detainment of defendant the State 
contended that defendant's voluntary consent to the pat-down search 
purged any prior violation of his fourth amendment rights. The 
court stated that generally a warrantless search is violative of 
the fourth amendment but that one of the specific established ex-
ceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause 
is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent, citing a Supreme 
Court case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte and two Utah cases, Arroyo 
and Marshall. The court stated: 
" In determining whether a consent to search is law-
fully obtained following a fourth amendment violation, 
a two prong test must be met for the evidence to be 
admissible: "(1) the consent must be voluntary in 
fact; and (2) the consent must not be obtained by 
police exploitation of the prior illegality." 
11
 * * * Even where the government proves the consent 
is voluntary, such consent cannot justify a search 
if the otherwise voluntary consent was obtained 
through the exploitation of an antecedent police 
illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91. Thus, if 
an antecedent police illegality exists, the govern-
ment must establish that the otherwise voluntary 
consent is sufficiently attenuated to have purged 
the taint of the original police illegality. Id. " 
" ^
n
 Arroyo, the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
several factors that merit consideration when de-
termining if consent was obtained as a result of 
an exploitation of a prior illegality. These fac-
tors include Miranda warnings, temporal proximity 
of the illegality and the consent, the presence of 
intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of 
the illegality. " 
" * * * The undisputed facts in the record establish 
that the consensual search which resulted in the ul-
timate discovery of the drugs occurred immediately 
after an illegal seizure. Defendant had been pre-
viously seized without reasonable suspicion at the 
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time he was requested to permit the pat-down search. 
Subsequently, he consented to and raised his shirt 
displaying the tape around his middle. There were 
no Miranda warnings, or other intervening circum-
stances documented in the record between the time 
of his illegal seizure, and the ultimate consensual 
search when he lifted his shirt revealing the tape 
which led to the discovery of the contraband. On 
the uncontroverted facts in the record before us, 
we conclude that defendant's consent first to the 
pat-down search and then to lifting his arms to 
allow the officer to see the taped packages he had 
previously felt during the pat-dowm search was 
tainted by his prior illegal seizure as a matter 
of law and, therefore, that the contraband should 
have been suppressed.11 
In the instant case the testimony of officer Davis was that 
after he asked if they (defendant and his passenger) needed any 
help they got back in their pick-up and attempted to leave. He 
then noticed the vehicle had tinted windows and asked defendant 
for his driver's license and vehicle registration as he intended 
to write him a warning citation. (Hng. Tr.P8) 
On re-direct examination by the prosecutor officer Davis 
was asked: 
f,Q. After you handed the citation to the defendants, 
were they free to go? (Hng. Tr. P38) 
A. No, I was going to ask them if I could search the 
vehicle. And then if they would have said no, 
they would have been free to leave." (Hng. Tr. P38) 
On re-cross examination the following conversation took place: 
"Q. Did you tell them that? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you read their Miranda rights to them or explain 
to them any rights that they may have? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. That was not done at any time prior to the search; 
is that correct? 
A. \'o it was not. " 
Trooper Davis' statement that appellant would have been free 
to go if he had refused to give his consent for the search of the 
pick-up seems unlikely but it supports appellant's contention that 
the officer had no reasonable basis or articulable suspicion to 
justify the detention of defendant even long enough for the query 
of what was being carried in the vehicle which led to the request 
to search. 
Given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
request to search; the age, education and background of defendant, 
the experience of officer Davis and the setting in which the re-
quest to search was made indicate that the consent to search was 
not voluntary nor free from coercion and/or duress. After com-
pleting the enforcement action for the tinted windows Officer Davis 
launched on an investigation of a more serious crime. From the re-
cord and considering all the circumstances it would be difficult to 
assume that defendant understood the significance of trooper Davis' 
request to search the vehicle, the scope of the search, that another 
officer would assist in the search, that a screwdriver or tools 
would be used to dismantle equipment. To what extent would the 
searching officers have continued had they not found the small bag 
of purported cocaine inside the speaker? 
The State failed its burden to prove that defendant's consent 
was voluntary in fact, free from coercion and/or duress and was not 
obtained by exploitation of the illegal detention by officer Davis. 
VII• CONCLUSION 
The detainment of appellant after he received the warning 
notice for tinted windows was unreasonable and was done so that 
officer Davis could further question defendant and search his 
vehicle in an attempt to discover evidence of a more serious crime. 
The detainment, questioning and resulting search cf defendant's 
vehicle violated his guaranteed constitutional rights and the evi-
dence obtained during that search should be held inadmissible. 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress and a reversal of his conviction. 
DATED this / <£ day of October, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND FINDINGS OF FACT PERTINENT TO CASE 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
(Unreasonable searches and seizures.) The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution 
(Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of Warrant) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affir-
mation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Findings of Trial Court at Hearing to Suppress Evidence 
No. 3. That the defendant was not in custody nor 
had he been restrained in any way or unreasonably de-
tained by the officer at the time the consent was given. 
• • * 
No. 6. That the defendant understood the officer 
when he reguested permission to search the vehicle, and 
consent was knowingly and voluntarily given. 
